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ABSTRACTS
Infants-Change of Custody
Petitioner Holstein (wife) had been awarded custody of the
children in a divorce action against defendant Holstein (husband).
Defendant Holstein subsequently obtained custody of the children
due to petitioner Holstein's indiscretions. Petitioner Holstein asked
to regain custody of her children on the ground that since they
were taken from her the circumstances of the parties had "materially
changed." The trial court granted her petition. Held, reversed. A
material change in circumstances is not sufficient to award a change
of custody. It must be shown that such change would materially
promote the welfare of the children. Holstein v. Holstein, 160
S.E.2d 177 (W. Va. 1968).
The dissent by Calhoun, J., in this case appears to be particularly
well-considered. It rests primarily on the general principle that the
discretion of a lower court with respect to changing the custody of
minor children, while subject to review, should not be disturbed
unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. This principle is dis-
cussed in 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 324 (1959).
The dissent also questions the contention of the majority that
the petitioner must show that the requested change of custody
will materially benefit the children. It is pointed out that this
principle seems to rest ultimately on a series of cases involving a
parent seeking custody of a child whom the parent had voluntarily
surrendered, not a child taken from the parent in an adversary pro-
ceeding as was the situation in the instant case. The cases are listed
in Whiteman v. Robinson, 145 W. Va. 685, 116 S.E.2d 691 (1960).
Negligence.-Leaving Keys in Unattended Vehicle
Defendant Bethea parked his automobile and left his keys in
the ignition, an act prohibited by South Carolina statutory law. The
automobile was stolen and the thief negligently collided with plaintiff
Stone's car. Stone brought an action against Bethea, the car owner,
to recover for injuries sustained in the collision. The trial court
granted the motion of the defendant for a directed verdict. Held,
affirmed. The leaving of his keys in the car by Bethea was not
the proximate cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. Stone
v. Bethea, 161 S.E.2d 171 (S.C. 1968).
W. VA. COw. ch. 17C, art. 14, § 1 (Michie 1966), is similar to the
South Carolina statute considered in the principal case. That West
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Virginia statute and its effect as applied to a factual situation similar
to that of the Stone case was considered in 60 W. VA. L. REV. 387
(1958). The conclusion was reached that the West Virginia court
would hold that the car owner could not be held liable because
the intervening act of the thief would constitute the sole proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury. Although the precise question has
never come before the West Virginia court, a recent federal district
court decision applying West Virginia law, West Virginia ex rel.
Poulos v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 263 F. Supp. 88 (S.D.W. Va.
1967), would seem to support that conclusion. The defendant car
owner in that case did not leave his keys in the ignition, but rather
negligently failed to turn the ignition to the lock position. In holding
the car owner not liable for injuries caused by the negligent driving
of a thief, the court deemed it "significant" that the car owner did
not leave his keys in the car to attract the attention of a passerby.
Logically, however, the result would seem to have been the same
even if the keys had been left dangling from the ignition.
Torts-Damages--Mother's Recovery for Emotional Trauma
and Physical Injury When Not Within the Zone of Impact
While negligently operating his motor vehicle, Legg collided with
Dillon's infant child. The collision resulted in the child's death.
Dillon witnessed the accident, but did not fear for her own physical
safety. She alleged that because of Legg's negligence she sustained
emotional disturbance, and shock and injury to her nervous system
which caused physical and mental pain and suffering. The superior
court granted a summary judgment in favor of Legg, and Dillon
appealed. Held, reversed. Emotional trauma and physical injury
caused by a mother's witnessing the death of her child as a result of
defendant motorist's negligent operation of an automobile established
a prima facie tort. Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912
(1968).
This case represents a significant advance in the field of torts
since it is the first case in the nation to allow recovery under these
circumstances. Generally, it has been held that a person who witnesses
an injury to a third person caused by a negligent tort-feasor cannot
recover for physical and mental injuries proximately caused thereby
unless he was within the zone of physical danger. See Annot., 18
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